

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE ☐ COLLECT
PAGE 13

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

51

OS

SS

Info

ACTION

BR

ESTO: 11/17/62

NOV 27 1962

DATE 11/27/62

EYES ONLY STEVENSON AND McCLOY

TO authority to: OADR

Re: DepTel 1159 and USUN 1606

NOV 27 1962

The President considers it important that following questions be clarified soonest in further conversations with Soviets:

1. We must, as set forth para 7 DepTel 1159, tie down Soviets to inclusion of IL-28s among offensive weapons to be removed. Your letter to Mikoyan (USUN 1606) was good move this regard. FYI As you know, yesterday's reconnaissance was inconclusive on whether Soviets taking any steps to disassemble and crate IL-28s. **END FYI**
2. President considers Khrushchev's commitment to UN verification on the ground as binding and integral part of understanding on which it is Soviet responsibility to deliver or provide substitute acceptable to US. If Soviets not able carry out this commitment for UN inspection on ground, a less satisfactory but possible alternative might be their making available to ICRC manifests of weapons together with sufficient ICRC inspection of outbound vessels to permit ICRC certify accuracy of such manifests.
3. Soviets should understand that, while we are sufficiently satisfied as to character of cargos Soviet vessels now in vicinity quarantine

Excom
Dist.

Drafted by:

G:UAJohnson:ges/nlh 11/2/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

W.H. - Mr. Bundy
DOB - Mr. Gilpatrick

U - Mr. Ball
S - The Secretary

S/S - Mr. Weiner

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FORM 5-61 DS-322

EYES ONLY

87 - 0082 116

CONFIDENTIAL

area and therefore willing to permit them to pass under hail procedures of which you have informed Kuznetsov, it would be impossible for us to continue such a procedure for vessels of type that have in past carried offensive weapons and will presumably be required to remove such weapons. Therefore, such vessels should not seek enter quarantine area until ICRC procedures are in effect unless they are prepared to accept US inspection.

4. President also very much has in mind that his exchange of letters with Khrushchev contemplates that, after completion removal present weapons, continuing arrangements will be required to assure against reintroduction of such weapons into Cuba (see President's letter of October 27 to Khrushchev). If the ICRC arrangement is not kept in place and the Cubans will not cooperate, some other measures will have to be devised. ~~Such measures particularly necessary in view domestic problem. USG is prepared to face with respect its undertakings on invasion. Further instructions will be sent you in this regard.~~

END.

NOTE: Passed Principal Officers Executive Committee by DCT

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL